4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)

3/19/2014 11:31 AM

DYNAMIC INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICE
AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
ALEX WHITING*
I
INTRODUCTION
The authors in this issue seek to sketch and analyze the practice of various
functions within the international criminal-prosecution process, in particular the
functions of the International Criminal Court (ICC). As part of this project, I
focus on the ICC’s practice of investigation. I identify the challenges that ICC
investigations face, and then articulate what can realistically be expected of
these investigations, given the identified challenges.
Because of the types of cases investigated by the ICC’s Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP), the young age of the court, and the OTP’s limited
investigative powers, the ICC has no uniform investigative approach across
cases. Although certain specific investigative practices exist in all cases—for
example, those dictated by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
1
Court (Rome Statute) and good investigative practice (such as the obligation to
investigate incriminating and exonerating information equally and the
obligation to protect witnesses)—each investigation is largely shaped by the
constraints and opportunities peculiar to the situation at hand. Thus, ICC
investigations are generally reactive, highly dynamic, and unpredictable. Over
time, evidence can become available or can disappear depending on many
factors, including political circumstances and issues of security.
Despite the general recognition of the investigative challenges and realities
faced by the OTP, a different conception of the OTP’s investigative practice—
one that presumes more control over the investigation itself—often creeps into
judicial decision-making and outside commentary. This is particularly apparent
in the long, ongoing debate about when the OTP should be required to
complete its investigation, with some judges and commentators insisting that, as
a matter of law, investigations must be completed even before the pre-trial
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chamber holds the confirmation hearing—the intermediate stage between arrest
2
or summons and the trial.
Nothing in the Rome Statute or the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
3
(RPE) compels this result. In fact, as has been pointed out by some dissenting
judges, the opposite is true: The Rome Statute and RPE appear not only to
allow continued investigation after the confirmation hearing, but to require it if
4
there exist further opportunities to obtain evidence. Rather, the impetus for
some judges insisting that the prosecution complete its investigation appears to
be a concern that the prosecution is not bringing strong enough cases, or that it
is bringing cases with undeveloped evidence, with the hope of conducting
5
substantial investigation as proceedings unfold.
These concerns are to some extent valid. There is no question that there is
room for improvement in the OTP’s investigations, and that the OTP has not to
6
date had the successes it had hoped for or expected. And there is also no
question that the investigative challenges faced by the OTP cannot be a reason
to lower the standard of proof or undo essential procedural protections for the
defense. Although the OTP must conduct focused investigations because of the
limits on its tools and resources, it also has to offer sufficient evidence to prove
its cases. Otherwise put, although the OTP may never be able to conduct
investigations that are as comprehensive as what can be done in a national
jurisdiction, it must do enough to meet the reasonable-doubt standard (or else
not bring charges). And further, although the OTP must be allowed to continue
investigating its case as long as there are opportunities to do so, the defense
must be made aware of the allegations against it sufficiently before trial to allow
it to investigate and prepare.

2. See Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 25 (June 3, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf.
3. Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 1st Sess., Sept. 3–10, 2002, Official Records,
pt. II.A., ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court, RPE],
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/official%20journal/
Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf (setting forth the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence).
4. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia
Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 15 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Kenyatta (Kenya II), Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application
Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, Corrigendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of
Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 90 (May 2, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1589189.pdf.
5. See Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ¶ 25 (June 3, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599831.pdf; Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on
Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ¶¶ 117–123 (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf.
6. In cases that have reached final judgment, the prosecution has achieved one conviction and
one acquittal. Of the fourteen cases that have passed through the confirmation process, ten have been
confirmed. The prosecution withdrew one case that was confirmed before trial began.
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At the same time, the rigid and formalistic insistence that the prosecution
complete its investigation before the confirmation hearing is flawed in two
7
respects. First, it is at odds with the Rome Statute and the RPE. Second, it
presumes an unrealistic investigative practice: one that does not and cannot
exist at the ICC.
In thinking about the prosecution’s investigation timeline, a more nuanced
and flexible understanding of the ICC’s investigative practice—one that
balances the realistic constraints on ICC investigations with the rights of the
accused—is required. To that end, I will try to identify some of the specific
challenges faced during ICC investigations to show that the manner in which
the prosecutor approaches investigations—in particular, how far she takes
investigations and when she “completes” them—are matters not necessarily
completely within her control, but are instead a function of the investigative
tools available to her and the nature of the crimes she must investigate. By
understanding the investigative process, we can better determine what to
properly expect from such investigations.
I will first examine the Rome Statute itself to see what it mandates in terms
of the scope and timing of ICC investigations before considering the critiques of
those investigations by judges and commentators. Then I will show how the
realities of ICC investigations require a flexible approach to scope and timing
questions, consistent with the rights of the accused.
II
THE ROME STATUTE AND THE ICC RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE:
INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS
Article 54 governs the scope of ICC investigations, specifying that the
prosecutor “shall . . . [i]n order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to
cover all facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is
criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate
8
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.” At first blush, the
obligations seem broad, particularly given the reference to “all facts and
evidence.” Further, the provision seems to require the prosecutor to take a
civil-law, investigative-judge approach, whereby the prosecutor gives equal
weight to incriminating and exonerating circumstances (though only a mediocre
prosecutor would not do the same in any adversarial system).
At the same time, article 54 does not oblige the prosecution to undertake an
unlimited investigation, requiring only that the investigation cover those facts

7. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia
Fernández de Gurmendi, ¶ 15 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf; Kenya
II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related
Requests, Corrigendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 90 (May 2, 2013),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1589189.pdf.
8. Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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and evidence that are “relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal
9
responsibility under the [Rome] Statute.” What is required, then, in terms of
scope of the investigation? Article 54 ties the prosecution’s investigatory
obligation to the relevance of the investigated evidence, but relevance is at each
stage contingent. That is, the relevance of evidence will shift along with the
substantive standard of proof. ICC proceedings involve three different
standards of proof at different stages of the proceedings. For an arrest warrant
or summons to appear, article 58 requires “reasonable grounds to believe that
10
the person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the court.” At the
confirmation hearing, article 61 requires that the chamber find “sufficient
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed
11
the crime charged.” And then of course at trial, article 66 requires the
prosecution to prove that the accused committed the crimes “beyond
12
reasonable doubt.”
So does article 54 merely require the prosecutor to investigate just enough
to pass each standard-of-proof threshold as she comes to the relevant stage of
the proceedings (arrest, confirmation, and trial)? The Rome Statute does not
appear to require any more than this, although as a matter of prudence and
ethics, most prosecutors will refrain from embarking on an arrest or summons
until they are sure they will be able to advance through the later stages of the
process. But what does that mean? Should the prosecutor always have in hand
sufficient evidence to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and have
“completed” her investigation, before even seeking an arrest warrant or
summons? Is it ever justifiable to have less? Under what circumstances? The
lines are not necessarily clear. And what happens if the evidence evolves after
arrest? For example, what if witnesses drop out of the proceedings, or evidence
that was not previously accessible becomes available—evidence that could be
either incriminating or exonerating? What is the prosecutor to do then? There
is no reason to think that the prosecutor’s article 54 obligation to investigate—
and it is an obligation—ceases simply because charges have been brought or
proceedings are underway.
Neither the Rome Statute nor the RPE contains provisions restricting
investigation timing. Article 61 provides that the pre-trial chamber (the body
that manages the case through the confirmation proceedings, at which point it is
handed off to the trial chamber for trial) shall confirm charges for which
substantial grounds have been established, but it does not say anything about
13
ending the investigation or freezing the facts or evidence at that stage. Rule 76
of the RPE requires the OTP to disclose its list of witnesses “sufficiently in
advance to enable the adequate preparation of the defence,” but it also allows
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the prosecutor to add witnesses when she has decided to call them. Article 64
of the Rome Statute requires the trial chamber to “provide for disclosure of
documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of
15
the commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.” In
practice, trial chambers have generally imposed a cut-off date before trial by
which all disclosure must be completed, but have also allowed the prosecution
16
to add limited additional evidence when the circumstances so warrant.
In sum, then, the Rome Statute and the RPE require the prosecutor to
investigate sufficiently to assess criminal liability, presumably to the requisite
standard at each stage of the proceedings, and require that the defense be
provided with the results of the OTP’s investigation with sufficient time to
prepare. There is no mandated end of the prosecution’s investigation. In fact, as
long as there exists evidence that is “relevant” to the prosecution’s assessment
of criminal liability, continued investigation appears to be required.
III
CHAMBERS AND COMMENTATORS: INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENTS
The appeals chamber first addressed the timing of prosecution
17
investigations in Prosecutor v. Lubanga. The pre-trial chamber below had
concluded—in the course of articulating rules for disclosure and redactions at
the confirmation hearing—that the prosecutor’s investigation “must be brought
to an end before the confirmation hearing, barring exceptional circumstances
18
that might justify later isolated acts of investigation.” The appeals chamber
reversed this holding, finding that, “[t]he duty to establish the truth [pursuant to
article 54] is not limited to the time before the confirmation hearing. Therefore,
the prosecutor must be allowed to continue his investigation beyond the
19
confirmation hearing, if this is necessary in order to establish the truth.” In

14. Int’l Criminal Court, RPE, supra note 3, at 26.
15. Rome Statute, supra note 1.
16. Article 64(3)(c) of the Rome Statute, supra note 1, requires the Trial Chamber to “provide for
disclosure of documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the
commencement of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.” Regulation 35(2) of the
Regulations of the Court is the vehicle for parties to submit evidence after the deadlines for disclosure.
Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, 5th Sess., May 17–28, 2004, Regulations of the Court,
regulation 35(2), ICC Doc. ICC-BD/01-03-11 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter Int’l Criminal Court,
Regulations],
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B920AD62-DF49-4010-8907E0D8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations_of_the_Court_170604EN.pdf; see, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the Prosecution Request for the Addition of Witness P-219 to
the Prosecution List of Incriminating Witnesses and the Disclosure of Related Incriminating Material
to the Defence (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc767521.pdf (setting a deadline for
incriminating material on January 30, 2009, but allowing Prosecution to add witness to the list).
17. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence” (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc193057.pdf.
18. Id. ¶ 49.
19. Id. ¶ 52.
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explaining its decision, the appeals chamber said that it
accepts the argument of the Prosecutor that in certain circumstances to rule out
further investigation after the confirmation hearing may deprive the Court of
significant and relevant evidence, including potentially exonerating evidence—
particularly in situations where the ongoing nature of the conflict results in more
compelling evidence becoming available for the first time after the confirmation
20
hearing.

Although the appeals chamber noted that “ideally, it would be desirable for
the investigation to be complete by the time of the confirmation hearing,” it
21
plainly held that “this is not a requirement of the [Rome] Statute.” In other
words, the appeals chamber expressed a purely aspirational goal, but not a legal
requirement, that the prosecution complete investigation prior to the
confirmation hearing.
22
Five years later, in Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, the appeals chamber
again touched on the timing of the prosecution’s investigation. The principal
question on appeal was not actually about timing, but was rather how the pretrial chamber should evaluate evidence at the confirmation hearing, given that
it was generally reviewing witness statements and documents rather than
23
hearing live testimony. The prosecution argued that the role of the pre-trial
chamber is simply to determine whether there exists sufficient evidence to send
the case to trial and that it cannot, given the type of evidence it is reviewing,
attempt to resolve apparent contradictions in the evidence or make credibility
24
assessments. Accordingly, the prosecution concluded that at the confirmation
stage the chamber should presume the credibility of prosecution witnesses and
should resolve perceived inconsistencies in the light most favorable to the
25
prosecutor, unless the evidence presented is plainly incredible or unreliable.
The appeals chamber rejected this position, concluding that the pre-trial
chamber “must necessarily draw conclusions from the evidence where there are
ambiguities, contradictions, inconsistencies, or doubts as to credibility arising
26
from the evidence.” In support of its conclusion, the appeals chamber stated
that “the investigation should largely be completed at the stage of the
confirmation of charges hearing. Most of the evidence should therefore be
available, and it is up to the prosecutor to submit this evidence to the Pre-Trial
27
Chamber.”
To support its assertion that the investigation “should largely be
completed”—which, it should be emphasized, is not the holding of the decision
20. Id. ¶ 54.
21. Id.
22. Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Judgment on the Appeal of the
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges” (May 30, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1420080.pdf.
23. Id. ¶ 16.
24. Id. ¶ 24.
25. Id.
26. Id. ¶ 39.
27. Id. ¶ 44. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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but rather a rationale for the holding—the appeals chamber cited solely to its
28
decision in Lubanga, in particular its statement that “ideally, it would be
desirable for the investigation to be complete by the time of the confirmation
29
hearing.”
But the Mbarushimana appeals chamber took this language from Lubanga
out of context, modified it, and completely changed its meaning. Lubanga holds
that the prosecution does not need to complete its investigation before the
30
confirmation hearing. Mbarushimana changed the aspirational language from
Lubanga from “ideally” to “should,” thus suggesting that the prosecution has
some obligation to complete, or largely complete, its investigation before the
31
confirmation hearing. But, again, the strict holding of Mbarushimana is only
that the pre-trial chamber must critically evaluate the evidence at the
32
confirmation stage, and does not reach the issue of prosecutorial duties.
Moreover, the appeals chamber in Mbarushimana cited to no provision in the
Rome Statute or RPE, and no precedent aside from the Lubanga decision,
supporting its assertion that the prosecution “should” largely complete its
33
investigation before the confirmation hearing.
Nonetheless, subsequent chambers and commentators have read the
language from Mbarushimana to mean that there exists a legally enforceable
presumption that the prosecution’s investigation should be completed by the
time of confirmation. In Prosecutor v. Kenyatta (Kenya II), the prosecution
asked the pre-trial chamber, pursuant to article 61(9), to amend previously
34
confirmed charges based on new evidence. The single judge of the pre-trial
chamber reviewed the Mbarushimana and Lubanga appeals chamber
jurisprudence on the timing of the prosecutor’s investigation and concluded
that, “the principle approach is that the prosecutor should be ready with the
investigation during said phase and any delay in doing so is exceptional and
35
should be justified.” Based on this conclusion, the single judge requested “the
Prosecutor to submit written observations clarifying the reasons for not
28. Id.
29. Id. ¶ 44 n.89.
30. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal Against the
Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles Governing
Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence,” ¶ 54 (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc193057.pdf.
31. Compare id., with Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Judgment on the Appeal of the
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on
the Confirmation of Charges,” ¶ 44 n.89 (May 30, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1420080.pdf.
32. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against
the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges,” ¶ 39.
33. See id.
34. Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision Requesting Observations on the “Prosecution’s Request
to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the
Statute” (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1546087.pdf.
35. Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
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conducting the investigation in due course in compliance with the Appeals
36
Chamber’s jurisprudence.”
In its response, the prosecution objected to the single judge’s requirement
that it justify its postconfirmation investigation. The prosecution noted that the
Lubanga decision, upon which Mbarushimana relied, had found no prohibition
37
on the prosecution continuing to investigate after confirmation.
Although the single judge ultimately granted the prosecution’s request to
amend the charges, she held firm to her view that “continuing investigations
after the charges have been confirmed cannot be the rule, but rather the
38
exception, and should be justified on a case-by-case basis.” Reviewing the
Lubanga appeals chamber decision, she reasoned that the appeals chamber’s
explanation for why the prosecution must be able to continue its investigations
after the confirmation hearing—the prosecution can continue investigating “in
order to establish the truth,” because if it cannot then “in certain
circumstances” the chamber will be deprived of “significant and relevant
39
evidence”—was in fact a limitation on these continued investigations. Thus she
found that the prosecutor could continue to investigate after confirmation only
if she could show that it was “necessary in order to establish the truth” or if
40
“certain circumstances” existed justifying further investigation. The single
judge concluded that
continued investigation [after confirmation] should be related only to such essential
pieces of evidence which were not known or available to the Office of the Prosecutor
prior to the confirmation hearing or could not have been collected for any other
reason, except at a later stage. In these circumstances, the Prosecutor is expected to
provide a proper justification to that effect in order for the Chamber to arrive at a fair
41
and sound judgment regarding any request for amendment put before it.

The single judge’s decision thus brought the law full circle, embracing, without
any basis in the Rome Statute or the RPE, the approach that was explicitly
42
rejected by the appeals chamber in Lubanga. Although the single judge
claimed to find support for her decision in the appeals chamber’s Lubanga
decision itself, she in fact turned it on its head. Even if in the end the
prosecution is not absolutely prohibited from continuing its investigation after
confirmation, it will still have to justify that investigation if it seeks to amend
the charges and perhaps even if it seeks to introduce the evidence at trial.
36. Id.
37. Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Prosecution Observations on the Conduct of Its
Investigations, ¶¶ 8–9 (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1549554.pdf.
38. Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum to “Decision on the ‘Prosecution’s Request
to Amend the Final Updated Document Containing the Charges Pursuant to Article 61(9) of the
Statute,’” ¶ 35 (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1571050.pdf.
39. Id. ¶¶ 35–36.
40. Id. ¶ 36.
41. Id. ¶ 37.
42. Compare id., with Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal
Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled “Decision Establishing General Principles
Governing Applications to Restrict Disclosure Pursuant to Rule 81(2) and (4) of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence,” ¶ 54 (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc193057.pdf.
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In Kenya II, the defense objected to evidence collected by the prosecution
43
after the confirmation hearing. The majority of the trial chamber found strict
limits on the prosecution’s ability to continue investigating after the
confirmation hearing, but struggled to justify these restrictions within the Rome
44
Statute, RPE, or jurisprudence. The majority conceded that “there may be no
formal preconditions for the prosecutor to continue investigating the same facts
and circumstances after they have been confirmed,” but then nonetheless went
45
on to describe limits to such investigative activity. Without citing any
authority, the majority declared that “the prosecution should not continue
investigating postconfirmation for the purpose of collecting evidence which it
46
could reasonably have been expected to have collected prior to confirmation.”
The majority explained that a prosecution seeking to conduct postconfirmation
investigation would bear the burden of showing that at least one of three
exceptions applied: first, that the prosecution “could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered [the evidence] prior to confirmation,” second, that
evidence that the prosecution had prior to confirmation had become
unavailable for trial and therefore needed to be replaced, or third, that the
prosecution had “justifiable reasons for believing” that it could not conduct
certain investigative steps prior to confirmation because of security concerns
47
that would be ameliorated only after confirmation. The majority found that if
the prosecution could not justify its continued investigation under one of these
three exceptions, then evidence uncovered after confirmation could be
48
excluded.
In Prosecutor v. Gbagbo, the majority of the pre-trial chamber adjourned
the confirmation hearing because it found the evidence presented by the
prosecution to be inadequate to confirm the charges but sufficient to provide
49
the prosecution with additional time to investigate. In a section entitled
Chamber’s Approach to Evidence, the majority explained that it would evaluate
the evidence at the confirmation hearing with the assumption that “the
Prosecutor has presented her strongest possible case based on a largely
50
completed investigation.” Elsewhere, the majority indicated that it was the
prosecutor’s responsibility to present “all her evidence” at the confirmation
51
hearing. Although it is often said that the confirmation is not to be a

43. Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on Defence Application Pursuant to Article
64(4) and Related Requests, ¶ 24 (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1585619.pdf.
44. Id. ¶ 119–21.
45. Id. ¶ 119.
46. Id. ¶ 121.
47. Id. ¶ 120.
48. Id. ¶ 121.
49. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the Confirmation of
Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Statute (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1599831.pdf.
50. Id. ¶ 25.
51. Id. ¶ 37.
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“minitrial,” it is difficult to see how the two are distinct if the prosecutor is
largely obliged to complete her investigation before confirmation and present
her strongest possible case, or all her evidence, at the hearing itself.
In both Kenya II (through a concurrence) and Gbagbo (through a dissent),
one judge of the panel took issue with the majority’s contention that the
prosecution must complete its investigation by the time of the confirmation
hearing, finding no support in the law or jurisprudence for this requirement. In
Kenya II, Judge Eboe-Osuji wrote that
[t]here is a concern that my colleagues’ pronouncements amount largely to the
beginnings of drips of dicta that will presently undermine the Prosecutor’s confidence
in conducting postconfirmation investigations when she sees the need; while possibly
crystallizing in the future into a hard limitation that will forbid postconfirmation
investigations, as a general rule, permitting them only in ‘exceptional circumstances.’
Such a development is unjustifiable as a matter of law and inhospitable to substantive
justice. Additionally, its sustainability
is highly questionable as a matter of policy and
52
practical implementation.

In addition to noting that the appeals chamber in Lubanga had specifically
overturned a pre-trial chamber decision limiting the prosecution’s ability to
investigate postconfirmation, Judge Eboe-Osuji pointed out that the majority’s
approach would result in endless litigation about whether any “exceptions”
53
permitted continued investigation by the prosecution.
Similarly, in the Gbagbo case, Judge Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi
dissented from the majority decision, finding, among other things, that the
majority had misread Mbarushimana to undo the holding of Lubanga:
“Regardless of the desirability of the ideal that investigations be largely
completed before confirmation of charges, I find it problematic that a policy
objective has been turned by the Majority into a legal requirement, something
54
that cannot be done without amendments to the legal framework.” Judge
Fernández found that the majority’s approach would force the prosecution not
just to “complete,” as much as possible, its investigation before the
confirmation hearing, but also to present all of its evidence during the hearing
55
itself, which would turn the confirmation hearing into the trial.
Commentators outside the court have also focused on the question of when
the prosecution must complete its investigation. The Open Society Justice
Initiative has recognized the potential import of the appeals chamber’s decision
in Mbarushimana. In an article entitled ICC Judges Demand More, Earlier from
Prosecutor’s Office it observed that although there exist strong reasons for
allowing the prosecution to continue to build its investigation throughout the
proceedings leading up to trial, the Mbarushimana judges nonetheless signaled
52. Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Corrigendum of Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge
Eboe-Osuji, ¶ 87 (May 2, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1589189.pdf.
53. Id. ¶ 99 (“Contrary to public policy, it will merely invite endless interlocutory litigation,
especially as to what amounts to ‘proper’ or ‘thorough’ or ‘full’ investigation.”).
54. Gbagbo, Case No. ICC-02/11-01/11, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández de
Gurmendi, ¶ 15 (June 3, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599832.pdf.
55. Id. ¶¶ 27–28.
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that they expect investigations to be largely completed by the confirmation
56
hearing stage. The Open Society Justice Initiative concluded that “[t]hese
judicial decisions will require a new approach from the ICC prosecution,
placing greater demands at the investigative stage, which the prosecution must
57
manage within the context of budget cuts and limited resources.”
On good practice rather than jurisprudential grounds, the American
University Washington College of Law’s War Crimes Research Office (WCRO)
concluded in a recent report that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, . . . a
better solution would be for the ICC Prosecutor to wait until a case is trial58
ready or almost trial-ready before any charges are ever presented to a judge.”
Although the WCRO acknowledged that the OTP can, and often should,
continue doing some investigation after confirmation, it nonetheless advocated
that the prosecution should essentially complete its investigation—that is, be
trial-ready—not just before confirmation, but even before any charges are
59
brought.
IV
THE REALITIES OF OTP INVESTIGATIONS
The judicial discussion and commentary concerning the OTP’s
investigations has focused on the Rome Statute and RPE, prior jurisprudence,
and the desire to have stronger cases from the OTP. Missing from the
discussion, however, has been any consideration of the realities of OTP
investigations. Completing the investigation at an early stage sounds
unobjectionable and desirable, but is it in fact possible?
It is important to consider this question because the relationship between
the desirable and the possible is a dynamic one. The ideal requirements of the
international criminal justice process should shape practice, but practice will
also inevitably shape the requirements. Although there are minimum
requirements below which the practice cannot fall—both substantively and
procedurally—beyond these minimums there is enormous room for variability.
The question here—the timing of the prosecution’s investigation in relation to
the confirmation hearing—presents precisely one such opportunity for
variability. There is no explicit provision addressing the timing issue in the
Rome Statute or the RPE, and no a priori requirement that the prosecution
complete its investigation before the confirmation hearing (itself a procedural
step that is not required by a fair trial). To be sure, there can be debates about

56. Alison Cole, ICC Judges Demand More, Earlier from Prosecutor’s Office, OPEN SOC’Y
FOUND. (June 5, 2012), http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/icc-judges-demand-more-earlierprosecutor-s-office.
57. Id.
58. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATION MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES, AND
TECHNIQUES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 10 (2012),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/warcrimes/icc/documents/ICCReport16.pdf.
59. Id. at 10–11.
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whether such a timing requirement is consistent with the framework of the
governing legal instruments, or is desirable for reasons of effectiveness,
efficiency, or fairness. But these debates should be informed by what is possible
regarding ICC investigations (itself shaped by the Rome Statute and the RPE).
The realities of the ICC’s war crimes investigations counsel against an
overly rigid approach to the timing of its investigations. The ICC OTP faces
challenges that most national investigators and prosecutors do not. National
investigators and prosecutors have the coercive power of the state behind them
60
and can drive investigations. They have an enormous range of tools with which
61
to investigate, and can act both proactively and reactively. Even when they are
acting reactively, they largely have the power to control the progress of the
investigation. Generally speaking, they can control a crime scene, obtain
62
records, and compel witnesses. The practice of national investigators is mostly
within their control. They can shape that practice to maximize both
effectiveness and efficiency, utilizing all of the tools at their disposal.
The practice of international investigators and prosecutors could not be
more different. They have no coercive powers and are dependent entirely on
63
the cooperation of states and individuals within those states. They generally
cannot control crime scenes, compel the production of documents, or compel
64
witnesses. They are almost entirely reactive, and cannot create a uniform or
consistent practice. Although some aspects of the investigation are dictated by
the Rome Statute, RPE, or minimum standards of investigative practice, in
many ways international investigators have to shape their practice to each
particular situation. In other words, there is no single practice, but lots of
practices across all of the cases.
Four aspects of the OTP’s investigations highlight the challenges of these
investigations and the potential for variability of practice across cases: budget,
cooperation, witness security, and the dynamic nature of war crimes
investigations. Investigative challenges and variability suggest that it will be
often difficult for the OTP to complete investigations at an early stage.
A. Budget
The 2013 budget for the ICC is €118.75 million, which is roughly equivalent
to the annual budget of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
65
Yugoslavia (ICTY). The difference is that the ICTY has been focused for
60. Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Prosecuting Massive Crimes with Primitive Tools: Three
Difficulties Encountered by Prosecutors in International Criminal Proceedings, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
403, 405–06 (2004) (cataloguing powers of national authorities to investigate crime).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 406; Alex Whiting, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed Can be Justice
Delivered, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 335–40 (2009) (exploring challenges to international investigations
and prosecutions).
64. Harmon & Gaynor, supra note 60; Whiting, supra note 63.
65. The ICTY was established by the United Nations Security Council in 1993 to prosecute war
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twenty years on three related wars in one region, while the ICC is presently
66
investigating in eight different situation countries.
Some commentators correctly identify the ICC budget as a cause of
deficient investigations, but then go on to suggest that the limited budget is
somehow the responsibility of the OTP. For example, the American University
Washington College of Law’s WCRO suggests that the limited budget has been
driven by the prosecutor’s “small team” approach to investigations and
recommends that “the OTP may want to reconsider its small team approach
67
and recruit more investigators.” Although few within the OTP would object to
the bottom-line recommendation, the WCRO has the cause and effect precisely
backwards. There has been no hint from the Assembly of States Parties (ASP)
of a willingness to increase dramatically the budget of the ICC, and in fact in
recent years the ASP has reduced the budget or held it at no growth, despite
68
requests at times for additional resources. Although there remains hope that
the ASP will increase the OTP’s budget in future years, nobody anticipates
69
astronomical increases.

crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (establishing the ICTY). For the budget, compare Int’l Criminal
Court, Assembly of States Parties, 11th Sess., Nov. 14–22, 2012, Proposed Programme Budget for 2013
of the International Criminal Court, ¶ 2, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/11/10 (Aug. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-10-ENG.pdf [hereinafter Int’l Criminal
Court, Proposed Programme Budget for 2013] (proposing a total 2013 budget for the ICC of €118.75
million), with G.A. Res. 66/239, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/239 (Dec. 24, 2011), and Nerma Jelačić,
Spokesperson, Registry and Chambers of the ICTY, Weekly Press Briefing (Jan. 11, 2012), available at
http://www.icty.org/sid/10886 (characterizing the ICTY’s gross budget for the 2012–2013 biennium as
$281,036,100, or approximately €103.91 million per year).
66. Compare Int’l Criminal Court, All Situations, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx (last visited Oct. 1,
2013) (listing nine countries in which the ICC currently has open investigations), with About the ICTY,
INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER YUGO., http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY (last visited
Oct. 1, 2013) (explaining that the ICTY’s jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed between 1991 and
2001 in the former Yugoslavia).
67. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 58, at 5.
68. Compare Int’l Criminal Court, Proposed Programme Budget for 2013, supra note 65, at ¶ 2,
with Int’l Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Programme Budget for 2012 of the
International Criminal Court, ¶ 12, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/10/10 (July 21, 2011), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/ICC-ASP-10-10-ENG.pdf (proposing a total 2012
budget for the ICC of €117.73 million).
69. Thomas Escritt, War Crimes Court Frustrated by Reliance on Witnesses, REUTERS (Sept. 20,
2013
10:15
AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/us-kenya-icc-investigationsidUSBRE98J0HY20130920 (indicating that OTP unlikely to get full budget increase it is seeking);
Blake Evans-Pritchard, Mali Case Throws Spotlight on ICC Budget Constraints, INST. FOR WAR &
PEACE REPORTING (Aug. 6 2012), http://iwpr.net/report-news/mali-case-throws-spotlight-icc-budgetconstraints (“The latest report from the budget committee of the Assembly of States Parties, the ICC’s
governing body, recognises that the court needs more money to meet these additional expenses.
Despite this, some member states are still reluctant to loosen the purse-strings.”); see also William W.
Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the
Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 54 (2008) (“Neither the legal mandate of
the ICC nor the resources available to it are sufficient to allow the Court to fulfill the world’s high
expectations.”).
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The budget and size of the court are a design reality of the ICC. States have
deliberately designed the ICC to be a relatively small institution with a limited
70
ability to investigate and prosecute cases. This design is in keeping with the
complementarity principle embedded in the structure of the court: the ambition
of the ICC is to spur states to prosecute their own cases rather than having the
71
ICC prosecute those cases. In addition, the limited size and powers of the
court no doubt reflect a certain ambivalence on the part of many states towards
72
the project itself. As Antonio Cassese has written, because of the stranglehold
of the principle of sovereignty, “[s]tates have established international criminal
courts and granted them authority to judge crimes of individuals—but they have
stopped short of backing up this authority with all the enforcement tools
73
required to make it fully operational.”
So how does the budget affect the OTP’s investigations? Plainly it affects
the number of investigators that can be assigned to any one particular case at a
time. The WCRO notes in its report that the OTP has approximately forty-four
investigators, and that there were at most twelve investigators assigned to the
Lubanga case (which is, in fact, a typical number of investigators assigned to a
74
case). Further, it should be clear that this number of investigators would not
change much even if the OTP dramatically reduced the number of situation
countries in which it is investigating. The reality is that although the court is
currently investigating in eight situation countries, it must focus its most intense
75
investigations on just a few countries at a time. Thus, even if the court reduced
the number of situation countries, it is likely that it would nonetheless always be
actively investigating several countries at once. Simply by doing the math, it
becomes clear that there will be a limited number of investigators for each case
at any given time.
Moreover, the limited budget might also affect the timing of investigations.
If the prosecutor has a limited budget and faces multiple investigations with
uncertain futures, then she will prioritize and focus on those investigations that
70. See Burke-White, supra note 69, at 60–61, 64–67 (noting that the ICC was designed to have
limited jurisdiction and weak enforcement mechanisms).
71. See NIDAL NABIL JURDI, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS:
A CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP 34 (2011) (explaining that the Rome Statute “primarily encourage[s]
local prosecutions”); see also Burke-White, supra note 69, at 55 (“[T]he Prosecutor noted that a key
strategic priority would be to take a ‘positive approach to complementarity. Rather than competing
with national systems for jurisdiction, we will encourage national proceedings wherever possible.’”).
72. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1,
11–13 (2005) (characterizing state support for the ICC as “unenthusiastic”).
73. Antonio Cassese, Reflections on International Criminal Justice, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 271, 273
(2011).
74. WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, supra note 58, at 24.
75. OPEN SOC’Y FOUNDS., PUTTING COMPLEMENTARITY INTO PRACTICE: DOMESTIC JUSTICE
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DRC, UGANDA, AND KENYA 9 (2011), available at
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/putting-complementarity-into-practice20110120.pdf (“While the ICC plays a critical role as a court of last resort, it will never have the
capacity to deal with more than a handful of cases at one time.”); WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE,
supra note 58, at 24.
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seem the most urgent or the most likely to move forward. As set forth in more
detail below, the prosecutor is faced with a host of investigative options at any
given time. There will be some investigable cases that are graver than others.
There will be some where the crimes are ongoing, and therefore where there is
pressure to act quickly in order to help stop the crimes. There will be cases
where there is a greater likelihood to apprehend the accused than in other
cases, and there will also be some cases with more international support (and
therefore more investigative opportunities) than others. At each moment the
prosecutor must calculate which case investigations are most urgent and most
likely to advance, so that she can focus her resources there.
But these decisions are just educated guesses, and they can be based on
shifting information. Take as a snapshot, for example, February 2011. Towards
the end of 2010, the prosecutor brought a new case in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (DRC) against Callixte Mbarushimana and two significant cases
76
in Kenya against six accused. In December 2010, serious postelection violence
broke out in Côte d’Ivoire, a country that the OTP was monitoring in a
77
preliminary examination phase. These events in Côte d’Ivoire led, in April
2011, to Laurent Gbagbo falling from power and his opponent, Alassane
Ouattara, taking control of the government and renewing a request to the ICC
78
to take jurisdiction and investigate crimes in the country.
Then, on February 26, 2011, the UN Security Council unexpectedly and
unanimously referred the unfolding situation in Libya to the International
79
Criminal Court. Although the OTP could supplement the budget with an
application for more funds from the contingency fund, getting that money takes
time and the OTP still had to face thebudget constraints described above.
What to do? The situation in Libya was unfolding and urgent, and the eyes
of the international community were on the court to see how it would react. A
significant investigative commitment was required, and potential witnesses were
76. See generally Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application
for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed
Hussein Ali (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037052.pdf (ordering the named
defendants to appear before the court); Prosecutor v. Ruto & Sang (Kenya I), Case No. ICC-01/0901/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto,
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1037044.pdf (ordering the named defendants to appear before the court); Mbarushimana, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Warrant of Arrest for Callixte Mbarushimana (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc954979.pdf.
77. See Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11, Decision on the
“Prosecution’s Provision of Further Information Regarding Potentially Relevant Crimes Committed
between 2002 and 2010,” ¶¶ 16–19 (Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1341467.pdf;
Adam Nossiter, Hundreds of Thousands Flee Ivory Coast Crisis, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011,
at A4.
78. See Adam Nossiter, Scott Sayare & Dan Bilefsky, Leader’s Arrest in Ivory Coast Ends
Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at A1; see also Letter from Alassane Ouattara, President of Côte
d’Ivoire, to the President of the Int’l Criminal Court (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/498E8FEB-7A72-4005-A209-C14BA374804F/0/ReconCPI.pdf
(accepting
ICC
jurisdiction over the situation in Côte d’Ivoire).
79. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).

4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)

178

3/19/2014 11:31 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 76:163
80

fleeing Libya, offering ample investigative opportunities. In time, a major
81
investigative commitment would also be required in Côte d’Ivoire. At the
same time, the office had to continue to build its cases in Kenya and in the
DRC. Throughout the year, therefore, the OTP had to constantly shift
resources around among these various priorities in order to try to conduct
82
sufficient investigations in each. And during the year, events would change and
develop, forcing the office to rethink its investigative strategy and
commitments. As mentioned above, in April 2011 the government changed in
Côte d’Ivoire and the need to investigate became more pressing. In August
83
2011, the Gaddafi regime fell and Muammar Gaddafi himself was killed.
Shortly thereafter, in November 2011, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, who by then had
been charged by the ICC with crimes against humanity, was captured in Libya
and the Libyan government indicated that it would itself seek to try the junior
84
Gaddafi. These significant events all required the office to react and to rethink
whether to continue on its present course or to shift resources around to more
urgent priorities.
Meanwhile, the OTP had a number of cases in the DRC and Uganda where
85
there were outstanding arrest warrants and uncertain prospects of arrest.
Could the prosecutor afford to continue to spend additional investigative
resources on those cases to ensure that the evidence remained current and
fresh? Over time, after all, witnesses might lose interest or even pass away. But
80. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement to the United Nations
Security Council on the Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011)
(May 4, 2011) [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo, Statement to the UN Security Council on the Situation in
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya] (transcript available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/0BDF4953B5AB-42E0-AB21-25238F2C2323/0/OTPStatement04052011.pdf) (noting that the ICC’s investigation
of the Libya situation involved missions in ten states); see also Aaron Gray-Block, Moussa Koussa
Sought by ICC Prosecutor, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Latest-News-Wires/2011/0406/Moussa-Koussa-sought-by-ICC-prosecutor.
81. See generally Situation in the Republic of Côte d‘Ivoire, Case No. ICC-02/11, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation
in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1240553.pdf.
82. As a result of resource constraints, the OTP is organized to allow for resources to shift among
investigative priorities. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Fifth Session
of the Assembly of States Parties: Opening Remarks 7 (Nov. 23, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/LMO_20061123_en.pdf) (“In terms of
budget, my office is confident that it can carry out its tasks with the current level of resources. This is
possible as a result of the rotational model employed by the Office, whereby joint teams move to
different situations or cases.”).
83. See Mary Beth Sheridan, Moammar Gaddafi is Captured, Killed as Last Loyalist Holdout in
Libya Falls, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-10-20/world/
35279328_1_sirte-moammar-gaddafi-mahmoud-jibril.
84. Clifford Krauss & David D. Kirkpatrick, Libyans Capture the Last Qaddafi Son at Large, a
Onetime Heir Apparent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A6; Francois Murphy, Libya Vows It, Not ICC,
Will Try Saif, Senussi, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2011, 10:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/
us-libya-icc-idUSTRE7AK08K20111121.
85. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Warrant of Arrest (Aug. 22, 2006),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc305330.PDF; Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen,
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant for Arrest of Joseph Kony Issued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27
September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.pdf.
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the prosecutor will not likely be able to justify devoting resources to these
dormant cases, even though an arrest can occur at any time. In fact, on March
18, 2013, Bosco Ntaganda, who had been a fugitive from the court for nearly
seven years, unexpectedly surrendered himself to the U.S. Embassy in Kigali,
86
Rwanda, asking to go to the ICC. Suddenly the office was forced to begin
reexamining its evidence in that case to ensure that the evidence was still
available, and to see whether a new investigation would be necessary.
The point is that with a limited budget and uncertain and changing
investigative needs, the Prosecutor must constantly react to shifting priorities
and opportunities. She has limited control over her own agenda and work. She
must not only predict where to focus her resources but also be prepared to shift
those resources when circumstances change. Sometimes the prosecutor will be
ahead of the curve, while other times she will have to play catch up, such as
when unexpected developments occur. As a result, cases will end up in different
stages of development, depending on many factors, one of them being the
resources available at any given time to investigate each case.
How does this shape investigative practice? The limited budget and
unpredictable circumstances mean that the practice must be flexible. Sometimes
the OTP will have both the resources and the opportunities to investigate
deeply and thoroughly. In other cases it will be more constrained. If resources
restrict the prosecution to focused investigation, but a unique opportunity for
arrest nonetheless arises, the office might feel compelled to move and to try to
bolster the investigation later. In other cases, because of a lapse of time
between the investigation and the arrest, the office might again have to
supplement its original investigation. In sum, the OTP’s limited resources make
it extremely difficult for the office to have one set investigative approach in all
of its cases.
B. Witness Protection
Article 68 of the Rome Statute mandates that “[t]he Court shall take
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well87
being, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses.” This provision has been
interpreted to compel the court to provide appropriate protection to any person
88
who is put at risk as a result of his or her interaction with the court. Witness
protection requires a careful assessment of the risks faced by the prospective
witness in the moment, as well as those that might be faced as future
developments unfold.

86. U.S. Confirms Bosco Ntaganda Turned Himself in at U.S. Embassy in Kigali, REUTERS (Mar.
18, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/18/us-rwanda-warcrimes-usa-confirmationidUSBRE92H0T620130318.
87. Rome Statute, supra note 1.
88. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor
against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled “First Decision on the Prosecution Request for
Authorisation to Redact Witness Statements,” ¶¶ 1, 44 (May 13, 2008).
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ICC witness-protection requirements are particularly acute, even more so
than most of those at the ad hoc tribunals (those tribunals established to
prosecute cases from one particular conflict, such as the tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda). As a permanent institution, the ICC is designed to
react quickly and to investigate events shortly after they occur, or even as they
are still unfolding. The cases investigated by the ICC are generally borne of
89
intense political and social upheavals where violence becomes the norm. Thus
the ICC will often be investigating in the context of general instability and
breakdown, with no expectation that national structures will be able to protect
witnesses. Further, because the ICC must focus its efforts on the most
responsible suspects, there will be an intense interest by those suspects to
90
frustrate the work of the court. The cost of any failure to protect witnesses will
be high, not just to the witnesses at issue but to the work of the court as well.
At the same time, witness protection is extraordinarily expensive, as much
to the witness and his or her family as it is to the court. In many cases, witness
protection requires out-of-country relocation of the witness and his or her
family. Relocation places an enormous burden on witnesses. Some contend that
in poorer countries where the ICC investigates, relocation is actually a positive
91
benefit that may cause some witnesses to fabricate their stories. That is no
doubt true in some cases. But in many cases, witness relocation is an enormous
sacrifice and hardship for the witness. Often witnesses are forced to leave their
home countries with little prospect of returning, and to go to an unfamiliar
92
country where they must completely rebuild their lives. And for the court,
moving a witness and his or her family out of one country into a new one
requires significant resources.
Because of the costs of witness protection (to both court and witness), the
OTP will always prioritize nonwitness evidence (documents, video, recordings,
and so forth) and will look for witnesses who have already made themselves
93
safe (generally through their own relocations). But the reality is that in many
89. Whiting, supra note 63, at 340.
90. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR (2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b2560aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf (“The global character of the ICC, its statutory
provisions and logistical constraints support a preliminary recommendation that, as a general rule, the
Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those
who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organisation allegedly responsible
for those crimes.”).
91. See, e.g., Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Second Corrigendum to the Defence Closing
Brief, ¶¶ 505–11 (June 29, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1436184.pdf (contending that
credibility of relocated witnesses must be carefully scrutinized).
92. See CHRIS MAHONEY, THE JUSTICE SECTOR AFTERTHOUGHT: WITNESS PROTECTION IN
AFRICA 43–44 (2010), available at http://www.issafrica.org/siteimages/WitnessProt.pdf (noting that the
relocation process is “cumbersome” and can have an impact on the well-being of witnesses).
93. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR 1970 (2011) ¶ 44 (2011)
[hereinafter OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
rdonlyres/A077E5F8-29B6-4A78-9EAB-A179A105738E/0/UNSCLibyaReportEng04052011.pdf (“The
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cases there exists very little nonwitness evidence, or if it exists it is not
94
accessible or available. The reality of the investigative practice at the ICC is
that witnesses have been, and likely will continue to be, at the center of nearly
95
all cases at the ICC. Moreover, because the ICC sits far from the sites of the
crimes it considers, it will necessarily depend heavily on “insider” witnesses who
have relationships with suspects that allow the witnesses to provide critical
96
information about those suspects. Such witnesses are particularly at risk—
because they are generally associated and allied with the suspected
perpetrators, and their testimony will be perceived as a particular betrayal and
especially threatening—and therefore almost always require significant
protection.
Because of the protection challenges, the OTP has always sought to keep its
97
investigations narrow and to rely on as few witnesses as possible. The OTP is
also extremely cautious about whom it interviews because even interviewing a
98
person can subject him or her to risk, such that the person requires protection.
Therefore, the office takes steps, including the screening of witnesses before
interview, to ensure that it only interviews individuals with relevant
99
information. Of course the prosecution has to develop sufficient evidence to
prove its case (itself a judgment call), but how deep a bench of additional
witnesses should it have? What is a “complete” investigation under these
circumstances?
Office seeks to rely on the smallest number of witnesses necessary to prove its case by conducting
focused investigations and by prioritizing the use of documentary and physical evidence. To the extent
that the Office relies on evidence from witnesses, it prioritizes witnesses who reside in safe areas.”).
94. INT’L BAR ASSOCIATION, WITNESSES BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 18
(2013) (noting the difficulty of obtaining nonwitness evidence); Patricia M. Wald, Dealing with
Witnesses in War Crime Trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J.
217, 218–19 (2002) (noting that ICTY cases are different from the Nuremberg trials insofar as in the
former there is no paper trail and no heavy reliance on witnesses); Whiting, supra note 63, at 338 n.72,
348 (noting that, in modern conflicts, perpetrators take steps to insure that crimes are not documented).
95. INT’L BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 94, at 12, 14 (“The ICC relies extensively on direct
witness testimony in order to function effectively.”).
96. Whiting, supra note 63, at 348 (critical role of insider witnesses).
97. MAHONEY, supra note 92.
98. Id. ¶ 43 (“The Office’s mandate of protection is established by Article 68(1) of the Statute and
extends to those persons who are at risk on account of their interactions with the Office. This includes
witnesses, screened individuals and their immediate family members, intermediaries, sources, and staff
members of the Office.”).
99. See Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Public Redacted version of “Decision on
the Defence Request for Disclosure of Pre-Interview Assessments and the Consequences of NonDisclosure,” ¶¶ 18, 31 (Apr. 9, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc857694.pdf (“Pursuant to
Article 54 of the Statute, the prosecution argues that conducting a pre-interview assessment with a
witness is a strategic, prosecutorial undertaking that should not be subject to scrutiny by the defence. . .
. Screening notes . . . are the result of a preliminary procedure, conducted prior to taking a statement,
during which the individual is assessed so that a decision can be made as to whether or not a statement
is to be taken.”); Interview by Tony Jones with Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court
(Aug. 6, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2007/s1998168.htm)
(“Because I have a duty to protect my witness I never went to Darfur to collect witness. So I had to
screen witness in 17 countries around the world, and I choose 100 of them and I’m protecting them,
yes.”).
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Moreover, in many cases, the chances of arresting the accused are uncertain.
This means that the OTP will be cautious about taking on too many witnesses
100
before arrest. But then, once the arrest occurs, there can be a scramble to find
and secure additional witnesses, a process that may not be complete by the time
that the confirmation hearing arrives. Further, much can change with witnesses
as time passes, whether before arrest or during the period between arrest and
confirmation (or even after confirmation). Witnesses can become intimidated,
they can lose interest, they can become less reliable, or they can have their
weaknesses exposed. And at no time can the prosecution compel witnesses to
101
come to the court and testify. Even when witnesses and their families have
been relocated at considerable expense, they can refuse to come before the
court. And even when witnesses do testify, they will sometimes change their
testimony or they will make a different impression on the judges than the
prosecution expects. Given all of these uncertain factors, how many witnesses is
enough? When has the prosecution done enough investigation?
These witness-protection realities require careful judgments by the
prosecution. It cannot interview and protect endless numbers of witnesses, but
it cannot take the risk of relying on too few either. Inevitably, however, witnessprotection challenges will require continuing investigation and adjustments to
the prosecution’s evidence. It is hard to imagine that the prosecution could ever
have a big enough reserve of witnesses on all key points to never have to
conduct further investigations. The costs of such an approach would simply be
too high. Besides, the prosecution must reserve resources for potential new
witnesses. As time passes, witnesses who might have been unavailable or
unwilling to cooperate at the early stages of the investigation may become
available if the risks evolve or diminish. These new witnesses might offer better,
more precise, or more complete information that should come before the court.
At some point or another, therefore, it is almost certain that the prosecution
will have to bolster its case by replacing witnesses who disappear or become
unwilling or unreliable. It is equally certain that the prosecution will at some
point want to supplement its case with the testimony of witnesses who were
previously unavailable. This, in turn, means that the prosecution must continue
its investigation both before and after the confirmation hearing.
C. Cooperation
As is well known, the OTP relies on the cooperation of other actors—
principally states as well as international and nongovernmental organizations
102
(NGOs)—to investigate its cases. Although it has investigators who work for

100. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Prosecution’s Urgent Request to
Postpone the Date of the Confirmation Hearing (May 23, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
doc/doc1595638.pdf (detailing challenges in investigations when arrests are uncertain or delayed).
101. INT'L BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 94, at 15 (“All witnesses who appear to testify before the
ICC do so voluntarily, even if they are key witnesses and their evidence is central to the case.”).
102. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, pt. IX (outlining cooperation regime).
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the OTP, they are dependent on the help of others to do their work. The OTP
investigators are free to accept evidence that is voluntarily provided (including
witness statements and documentary evidence), but even then they require the
103
permission of relevant states to travel to collect the information. In particular,
if a situation country chooses not to cooperate with the OTP, or to cooperate
incompletely, it can have dramatic consequences for the ability of the OTP to
investigate.
104
The cooperation regime is set forth in part IX of the Rome Statute. The
cooperation of States Parties with the work of the court is, for the most part,
mandatory. Article 86 establishes a general obligation to cooperate, stating that
“States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate
fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the
105
jurisdiction of the Court.” Article 93 sets out a list of mandatory forms of
cooperation, including identifying the location of persons and items, taking
evidence, examining locations, providing documents, and executing searches
106
and seizures.
The difficulty, however, is not with the specified forms of cooperation, but
rather with the enforcement. If states do not cooperate, or, as is more often the
case, they cooperate in form but not in substance, then the only recourse
available to the prosecutor is to raise the matter with the chamber. The judges
can make a finding of noncooperation pursuant to article 87(7) and then “refer
the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council
107
referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.” This process offers
an opportunity for other states to exert pressure on a noncompliant state, but it
is hardly a sure way to obtain cooperation. The reality is that if states do not
find it in their own interest to cooperate with the court and are not pressured by
other actors in the international community who have the ability to exert
pressure, then the OTP will be forced to find ways around the noncooperation.
Because cooperation is tied to state interests, it is rarely static. States can
become cooperative after refusing to help, or can suddenly stop providing
assistance after having been cooperative. In the former Yugoslavia, both
Croatia and Serbia were initially reluctant to cooperate with the ICTY, but
were later persuaded by pressure from the United States and the European
108
Union to do so. At the ICC, the government of Sudan has provided almost no
109
cooperation to the court. Kenya initially pledged to be cooperative with the
103. See id. at arts. 54, 87(1), 93. But see id. at art. 57(3)(d).
104. Id. at pt. IX.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Whiting, supra note 63, at 343–44.
109. See Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Statement to the United Nations
Security Council on the Situation in Darfur, the Sudan, Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) ¶ 7 (Dec. 13,
2012)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/statements/UNSC1212/
UNSCDarfurSpeechEng.pdf) (describing the Sudan government’s lack of cooperation in the ICC’s
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prosecutor’s investigation of postelection violence there, but cooperation
110
slowed once significant actors in the country were charged. When the UN
Security Council referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, there was
considerable interest and support from many countries that were willing to
111
assist in the investigation. Once the war ended and Gaddafi fell, however, the
112
interest of these states diminished.
The prosecution must both plan for the possibility that cooperation will
disappear (which can also have an impact on witness security for those
witnesses who remain within the situation country) and find ways to take
advantage of cooperation opportunities that might arise. And it is rarely so
simple as a matter of one country’s cooperation or noncooperation. The
investigations of the OTP focus always on one situation country, but the
113
opportunities to gather evidence generally span many countries. And states
will sometimes be willing to cooperate on some aspects of an investigation, but
114
not others.
Because cooperation is largely outside the control of the office and is highly
variable and unpredictable, the investigative practice of the office must adjust to
different circumstances. When there is cooperation, the office will identify and
interview witnesses and collect nonwitness evidence that may be available.
When cooperation is limited, the investigators will have to become more
creative in their search for evidence. If the situation country refuses to
cooperate, for example, then the office will search for witnesses who have left
the country voluntarily or will seek evidence collected by other parties with
better access to the country.
In sum, the ability to investigate and to obtain information and evidence can
be extremely variable in any given point in time, and is also constantly in flux.
investigation).
110. Kenya II, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Public redacted version of the 8 May 2013 Prosecution
response to the “Government of Kenya’s Submissions on the Status of Cooperation with the
International Criminal Court, or, in the alternative, Application for Leave to file Observations
pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence” (May 10, 2013), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1591193.pdf.
111. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT, supra note 93, at ¶ 28 (characterizing the
support of states parties for the Libya investigation as “excellent”).
112. Compare id., with OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIFTH REPORT OF THE PROSECUTOR OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TO THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PURSUANT TO UNSCR
1970 (2011) ¶ 8 (2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/UNSC-report-Libya-May2013Eng.pdf (noting that some requests to states for cooperation in the Libya investigation have not been
fulfilled and urging States Parties to cooperate fully with the investigation); see also Patricia M. Wald,
Apprehending War Criminals: Does International Cooperation Work?, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 229,
251–52 (2012).
113. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Prosecution’s Urgent Request to Postpone the Date of
the Confirmation Hearing, ¶ 28 (May 23, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1595638.pdf
(support from multiple states in Libya investigation); Interview by Tony Jones with Luis MorenoOcampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 99 (discussing the screening of Darfur witnesses
in 17 countries).
114. Wald, supra note 112, at 230, 245–46, 251 (describing how cooperation requirements interact
with other foreign-policy imperatives).
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This reality is yet another reason why it is extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to finalize an investigation in any given point in time.
D. Dynamic Investigations
At any given time, the prosecutor has to consider and weigh all of the
different variables when deciding where to investigate, what resources to
dedicate, how fast to go, when there is enough evidence, and when to move to
the next phase. To employ a cliché, planning and conducting an investigation at
the ICC is like playing three-dimensional, or even four- or five-dimensional,
chess. And to add to the factors that the prosecutor must consider, situation
countries and the significant actors therein (including potential accused and
witnesses) are themselves frequently in a state of flux (and may be taking steps
to actively thwart the OTP’s investigations).
The politics of a country that is in conflict, or is emerging from conflict, can
change dramatically and quickly, affecting all those who are deeply embedded
in political structures, with significant consequences for the investigation itself.
And as noted above, unlike most domestic prosecutors (or investigating
judges), prosecutors at the ICC have very few tools with which to control the
variables they confront. They cannot lock down testimony, they cannot compel
witnesses, and they cannot easily obtain nonwitness evidence (through, for
example, wiretaps, document subpoenas, surveillance, and so forth).
Moreover, there is often a dynamic relationship between the ICC and the
investigation itself. The progress of an investigation may have an influence on
the willingness of witnesses to participate. For many, cooperating with an ICC
investigation will amount to a significant political act: The cooperator will be
siding with investigators against entrenched centers of power. That choice will
be particularly acute for “insider” witnesses who are usually insiders precisely
because they are close to the potential suspects. For them, choosing to
cooperate with the ICC is often a life-changing event. Some will not be
prepared to make this choice until they are certain that the ICC is going to act,
or until they see that the suspect is going to be arrested, or until they know if
the suspect will be detained, or even until they see if the judges will confirm the
charges. At the same time, some witnesses will become more afraid or deterred
once an investigation or prosecution progresses. Thus not only is the office
investigating in a dynamic environment, it is affecting that environment through
its investigative actions.
The office confronted many of these circumstances in the Libya
investigation. As noted above, the Libya case was unexpectedly referred to the
115
ICC on February 26, 2011, just eleven days after the conflict began. The
unanimous referral marked significant confidence in, and support for, the ICC,
and many countries immediately offered to assist the office in its investigative

115. S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
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116

efforts. At the same time, the prosecutor was justifiedly concerned that the
support for the ICC’s work would not necessarily last (in fact it did not), and he
also thought that the ICC had an important role to play in immediately
117
deterring ongoing crimes in the conflict. For those reasons, he believed that it
was important for the office to move as quickly as possible in its investigations.
The office faced serious witness-security challenges when beginning
investigations. Although the eastern part of Libya quickly came under the
control of the rebels, and many journalists and NGOs traveled to Benghazi and
118
other cities in that area, the ultimate success of the rebels was far from certain.
The office had to consider that if investigators interviewed witnesses in Libya
and Gaddafi’s forces then retook control over the country, then the ICC would
have no way of protecting those witnesses (who would no doubt be exposed as
ICC contacts or witnesses). In addition, according to the information then
available, even though the rebels controlled the eastern part of Libya, there
were still Gaddafi loyalists who could threaten persons perceived as supporting
119
the ICC. Accordingly, at the beginning of the investigation, the office looked
for evidence that was already outside of Libya or that was obtained by
120
individuals who were able to travel into the country. As a result of the
conflict, many people, including many high-level insiders who defected, went to
121
Egypt, Tunisia, other countries in the Middle East, as well as Europe. In
addition, many people who left brought out pictures, videos, and reports of
events, as did many journalists and NGO investigators who went in and came
122
out again.
116. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, FIRST REPORT, supra note 93.
117. See Marlise Simons, International Criminal Court Begins Libya Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04hague.html?_r=0 (quoting ICC Prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo as saying that ICC intervention in Libya would have a “deterrent effect”).
118. See generally Martin Chulov, Libyan City Dubbed ‘Free Benghazi’ as Anti-Gaddafi Troops
Take Control, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2011, 9:08 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/feb/23/libya-free-benghazi-anti-gaddafi-troops, Lauren Smith-Spark, Are Libya’s Rebels
Edging Closer to Victory?, CNN (Aug. 18, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/
africa/08/17/libya.war.momentum/index.html.
119. See Adrian Blomfield, Libyan Rebels Step up Purge against Gaddafi Loyalists, TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 1, 2011, 8:23 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/
8675874/Libyan-rebels-step-up-purge-against-Gaddafi-loyalists.html (indicating that Gaddafi loyalists
continue to operate within rebel-controlled territory in Libya); Yaroslav Trofimov, Gadhafi Loyalists
Emerge in Rebel Areas, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704396504576204621346511898.html.
120. See Moreno-Ocampo, Statement to the UN Security Council on the Situation in the Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, supra note 80 (noting that in the investigation’s initial phase no interviews were
performed inside Libya).
121. See, e.g., Another Senior Libyan Official Resigns, NBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2011, 1:27 PM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/42354835/ns/world_news-europe/t/another-senior-libyan-officialresigns/#.Uj35Zj-Ak6k; John F. Burns & Scott Sayare, Libyan Oil Minister Said to Defect to Tunisia,
N.Y. TIMES ( May 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/world/africa/18libya.html; David D.
Kirkpatrick & C.J. Chivers, Anxiety Roils Libyan Capital Amid Top-Level Defections, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/01/world/africa/01libya.html?pagewanted=all.
122. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, THE BATTLE FOR LIBYA: KILLINGS, DISAPPEARANCES, AND
TORTURE (2011), available at http://openanthropology.org/libya/AI_Battle_of_Libya.pdf; RICHARD

4 WHITING (DO NOT DELETE)

Nos. 3 & 4 2013]

3/19/2014 11:31 AM

DYNAMIC INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICE

187

Many of the witnesses who left Libya were willing to talk, while some likely
wanted to wait to see how events would unfold in Libya and who would come
123
out on top. Investigators had to consider that some who were implicated in
the events but later defected might be willing to tell only part of the story,
particularly in the early days, while others might be more forthcoming. In a
period of approximately three months, the OTP was able to present an arrestwarrant application to the pre-trial chamber, and warrants for Muammar
Gaddafi, his son Saif Al-Islam, and his Military Intelligence Chief Abdullah Al124
Senussi were issued one month later. The task was made easier because there
was clear evidence that Muammar Gaddafi exercised tight control over the
125
country and that the other two suspects worked closely with him. The various
military and security forces that violently suppressed the rebels would not have
126
done so without clear direction from the top. Evidence from witnesses, as well
as video of Gaddafi and Saif and speeches by them, showed that the suspects
127
directed the attacks on protesters.
Was the prosecution’s investigation complete? No. The limited access to
Libya made that impossible. Should the OTP have continued collecting
evidence before bringing an arrest-warrant application? It is difficult to argue
that this would have been a wise approach. A few months after the arrest
128
warrants were issued, the Gaddafi government fell and the war was over. The
SOLLOM & KATHERINE CLOSE, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, WITNESS TO WAR CRIMES:
EVIDENCE FROM MISTRATA, LIBYA (2011), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/
Libya-WitnesstoWarCrimes-Aug2011.pdf; see also Jeremy W. Peters, Free Times Journalists Give
Account of Captivity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/22/world/africa/
22times.html?pagewanted=all.
123. See Libya: Col Gaddafi expected to be among ICC arrest warrants, TELEGRAPH (May 16, 2011,
11:38 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8516171/LibyaCol-Gaddafi-expected-to-be-among-ICC-arrest-warrants.html; Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l
Criminal Court, Statement by ICC Prosecutor on decision by Pre-Trial Chamber I to Issue Three
Warrants of Arrest for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdulla Al-Senussi (June 28,
2011) (transcript available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/
office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%20statements/statement/Pages/statement%20by
%20icc%20prosecutor%20on%20decision%20pre_trial%20chamber%20i%20to%20issue%20three%
20warra.aspx) (stating that inner circle can be part of the problem or part of the solution).
124. See Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for
Abdullah Al-Senussi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099332.pdf; Situation in
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu
Minyar Gaddafi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099321.pdf; Situation in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Warrant of Arrest for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi (June 27,
2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099329.pdf; Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Case No. ICC-01/11, Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu
Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi (May 16, 2011), http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf.
125. See Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Case No. ICC-01/11, Prosecutor’s Application
Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and
Abdullah Al-Senussi, ¶¶ 1–7 (May 16, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1073503.pdf.
126. See id. ¶ 8–15, 35.
127. See id. ¶¶ 8–23.
128. See Timeline: Libya’s Civil War Nears End, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2011, 7:25 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/us-libya-events-idUSTRE79J24N20111020.
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Libyan public’s attention, and to a large extent the attention of the international
community, turned away from what had happened during the war and towards
129
rebuilding Libya, creating a new government, and enhancing security. Had the
prosecution waited, its work would have been far less relevant.
At the time the OTP sought arrest warrants, it already had strong evidence.
But at that time the OTP also knew, from a practical perspective, that if the
Libyan suspects were ever arrested and brought to The Hague, additional
evidence would then become available by way of unfettered access to Libya.
Thus although the investigation was incomplete, the OTP could have high
confidence that it could prove its cases to the requisite standard.
By acting during the conflict, the court set down an important marker. The
130
arrest warrants were welcomed by Gaddafi opponents within Libya.
Moreover, when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization war effort in Libya
began to stall in the early summer of 2011, reports emerged that France was
131
interested in negotiating a settlement. The arrest warrants constrained the
ability of international actors to consider granting any form of immunity to
Gaddafi and his close associates. When the Gaddafi government fell, the
existence of the warrants also served as a benchmark for the treatment of
accused war criminals in the former regime. Although this process was not
respected in the case of Gaddafi himself, who was captured and almost
immediately executed by a mob, the emerging government of Libya has made a
132
commitment to investigate and prosecute Saif and Al-Senussi. Whether they
succeed or not, the intervention of the ICC will serve as the standard by which
their efforts are measured. In sum, then, it was important for the ICC to act,
even if the investigation was not yet complete.
V
CONCLUSION
All of the different situations investigated by the ICC present, and will
continue to present, different challenges. Sometimes, all of the various factors
will point towards support for investigation and prosecution, and the work of
the ICC will advance in an orderly fashion, allowing the OTP to complete all of
its investigation before the confirmation hearing or even before bringing
charges. But in most cases the investigative practice of the ICC will necessarily
be reactive and dynamic. It will require adjusting practice in order to respond to
129. Mark Kersten, Between Justice and Politics: The International Criminal Court’s Intervention in
Libya
22,
(Working
Paper),
available
at
http://www.academia.edu/1558775/
Between_Justice_and_Politics_The_International_Criminal_Courts_Intervention_in_Libya (describing
loss of interest by international community in pursuing justice in Libya).
130. ICC’s Ocampo: ‘Justice will be done in Libya’, ALJAZEERA (June 28, 2011, 11:53 AM),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/06/2011628103224511523.html.
131. Ruth Sherlock & Richard Spencer, Libya: France Risks NATO Split Over Call for Gaddafi
Talks, TELEGRAPH (July 11, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
africaandindianocean/libya/8630778/Libya-France-risks-Nato-split-over-call-for-Gaddafi-talks.html.
132. Murphy, supra note 84.
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changed circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities that arise.
Given all of the variables and the OTP’s limited tools to control and manage
all of the different moving parts, an overly rigid and formalistic approach that
insists that the investigation be “complete” before arrest or confirmation is
unwise. The procedures and process must account for the realities of practice at
the ICC. Although the prosecution cannot investigate its case forever, and the
rights of the defense require that it know the case that it must answer, there
must be some flexibility in allowing the prosecution to continue its
investigations even after confirmation in order to insure that it fulfill its
obligation to uncover the truth.

